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Abstract. The Pixel Non Uniformity (PNU)[22] is an essential and re-
liable tool to perform Source Camera Identification (SCI) and, during
the years, became a standard de-facto for this task in the forensic field.
In this paper, we show that, although strategies exist that aim to can-
cel, modify, replace the PNU traces in a digital camera image, it is still
possible, through our experimental method, to find residual traces of the
noise produced by the sensor used to shoot the photo. Furthermore, we
show that is possible to inject the PNU of a different camera in a target
image and trace it back to the source camera, but only under the condi-
tion that the new camera is of the same model of the original one used
to take the target image. Both cameras must fall within our availability.
For completeness, we carried out 2 experiments and, rather than using
the popular public reference dataset, CASIA TIDE, we preferred to in-
troduce a dataset that does not present any kind of statistical artifacts.
A preliminary experiment on a small dataset of smartphones showed
that the injection of PNU from a different device makes it impossible to
identify the source camera correctly.
For a second experiment, we built a large dataset of images taken with
the same model DSLR. We extracted a denoised version of each image,
injected each one with the Residual Noise (RN) of all the cameras in
the dataset and compared all with a Reference Pattern (RP) from each
camera. The results of the experiments, clearly, show that either in the
denoised images and the injected ones is possible to find residual traces
of the original camera PNU.
The combined results of the experiments show that, even in theory is
possible to remove or replace the PNU from an image, this process can be,
easily, detected and is possible, under some hard conditions, confirming
the robustness of the PNU under this type of attacks.
Keywords: Pixel Non Uniformity · Source Camera Identification · Anti-
forensics.
1 Introduction
The explosive growth of digital cameras and of their pervasive applications has
led to an exponential increase of cases where the analysis of digital images plays
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an important role in crime investigations. Consequently, a new branch of com-
puter forensic science has been introduced under the name of Digital Image
Forensics.
A frequent problem that arises when conducting this type of investigation is
about the identification of the camera that has been used to take one or more
digital images under scrutiny. We define this problem as the Source Camera
Identification problem (SCI, for short). A popular approach for the solution of
this problem is to resort to the analysis of the Sensor Pattern Noise. This is
a characteristic noise that is left in a systematic way by digital sensors when
acquiring new images. As widely discussed by the several publications in this
field (see, e.g., [22]), it is possible to use this noise to determine a sort of unique
fingerprint corresponding to the originating digital sensor.
The reliability of this approach has been assessed in several experimental
studies. As a relevant result, it has been shown in [25] that, assuming the origi-
nating camera C of a digital image I under scrutiny is available to an investigator,
it is possible to identify C as the source camera for I with a very high level of
confidence.
In the recent years, several counter-forensics techniques have been proposed
for deceiving source camera identification. Here, the goal may be to prevent the
identification of C (e.g., [23]) or to modify I so as to make it result as taken by
a different camera (e.g., ).
In this paper, we focus on one of the most interesting counter-forensics tech-
nique, by describing a simple methodology for implementing the spoofing of a
digital image. Our experimental results show that the proposed implementation
succeeds in modifying a digital image so to make it result as taken using a camera
different than its originating one. More surprisingly, our results also show that
the filtering procedure, that is commonly used to remove from a digital image
the traces about its originating camera, is partially uneffective. Consequently,
it is still possible to reveal the source camera used to take a spoofed picture by
means of a simple modification of the original source camera identification algo-
rithm, thus confirming the robustness of the PRNU noise as a mean to perform
source camera identification.
2 PRNU-based Source Camera Identification
In this section, we briefly outline one of the most popular Source Camera Iden-
tification technique, originally introduced by Fridrich et al. in [22].
Their technique starts from the observation that the pattern noise of a digital
image includes two main components: the Fixed Pattern Noise (FPN) noise and
the Photo-Response Non Uniformity (Photo-Response Non Uniformity (PRNU))
noise. FPN is an additive noise caused by dark currents and, also, depending on
exposure and temperature
PRNU noise is a multiplicative noise dependent and is composed of :
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– low frequency components or defects (due to, e.g., light refraction on dust
particles, optical surfaces, zoom settings). They are of low spatial frequency
in nature; therefore, they cannot be considered a characteristic of the sensor;
– PNU noise, defined as the different sensitivity of pixels to light caused by the
inhomogenity of silicon wafers used to manufacture digital sensors as well as
other imperfections arising during the sensor manufacturing process.
The key observation is that is very unlikely that different sensors, even man-
ufactured using the same wafer, would exhibit correlated PNU patterns. So,
the PNU noise is an intrinsic characteristic of each sensor and, thus, it can be
effectively used for sensor identification.
Let I be a digital image under scrutiny, the Fridrich et al. source camera
identification technique can be summarized as follows:
Step 1 A residual noise x is extracted from I
x = I − F (I) (1)
where F is a denoising function. This is an approximation of the noise existing
in I, including the PRNU noise. We will denote this residual noise as x(I).
Step 2 PRNU pattern of a reference camera was estimated from a series of
photos taken with this camera. We adopt the maximum likelihood approach [11]
to estimate the camera’s PRNU pattern:
K =
∑N
i=1 x
(i)I(i)∑N
i=1 (I
(i))2
(2)
where N is the series of images used to extract PRNU K.
Step 3 A correlation statistic is used to measure the similarity between the x and
K. In this document, we use a correlation statistic called correlation on Circular
Cross-Correlation Norm (CCN) [20], which is defined as:
c(x, y) =
xy/L√
1
L−|A|
∑
m/∈A r2xy(m)
=
rxy(0)√
1
L−|A|
∑
m/∈A r2xy(m)
(3)
where y = KI, A is a small neighbourhood around zero displacement,
∣∣A∣∣ is the
measurement of A, and the CCN rxy(m) is defined as
rxy(m) =
1
L
L−1∑
I=0
xlyl⊕m (4)
where the operation ⊕ is the module N addition. The investigator identifies the
camera source by comparing the CCN value with a predefined threshold. The
higher the CCN value, the more likely the test image is taken by the reference
camera.
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3 Deceiving PRNU-based Source Camera Identification
3.1 Source Camera Identification Counter-forensics Techniques
Counter-forensics techniques aim at making the analysis of evidence difficult
or impossible to be carried out or, at least, they try to negatively affect the
existence and the quality of evidences. In this work, we focus on counter-forensics
techniques targeting source camera identification methodologies. According to
literature, these can be grouped in the following cases:
Fingerprint-Removal : in order to prevent the identification of the source
camera C used to take a digital image I, the fingerprint of C in I is removed
or altered;
Fingerprint-Injection : in order to make a digital image I result to have been
taken using a camera C′ different than the original one, the fingerprint of C′
is properly injected in I;
Fingerprint-Substitution : a mix of the two previous attacks where, the fin-
gerprint of the source camera C used to take a digital image I is removed
from I and replace with that of a different camera C′ . This is attack is
particularly useful to produce false evidences.
Fingerprint-Remove Attacks
Basic Fingerprint Removal : it estimates the model and the entity of the intrinsic
strength of the PRNU of a picture and, then, subtracts it from that picture [28].
Adaptive Denoising PRNU (ADP) : It repeatedly applies a denoising filter to
an image until it has sufficiently suppressed its PRNU noise so to prevent its
source mapping. The goal is to get an image which would correlate very poorly
with its own PRNU noise pattern [21]
Seam-Carving : It is a content-sensitive image scaling technique used to disturb
the reference noise pattern of an image. In this technique, a seam, which is a
horizontal or vertical linked path of low-energy pixels, is removed or inserted into
the image in a forced manner (at least one carved seam in a n x n block). When
a seam is removed, the remaining pixels are shifted to fill the gap. The main idea
behind image resizing based on seam engraving is to remove unnecessary parts
of the image while keeping important content intact [26].
Fingerprint-Injection Attacks
Fingerprint-Copy Attack : In this technique, it is first estimated the fingerprint
of a camera C1 using a collection of images (e.g., a set of stolen images). Then,
it is superimposed into a target image taken by a different camera C2 to disguise
the resulting image as one taken by C1 [5,13].
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Fingerprint-Substitution Attacks
Anonymization : the technique misleads the identification of a camera C1 based
on the noise model of the PRNU sensor, using a median filter to suppress the
PRNU noise existing in an image I taken with C1.
The PRNU of I is removed and the variance of the PRNU of another camera
C2 is introduced to make the identity anonymous. The identity of I is forged
in such a way that it now appears that the image was produced by C2 rather
than C1 or the counterfeit image has small traces of the original capture device
[24,27]
3.2 Contrasting Counter-Forensic Techniques
Source camera identification techniques are generally robust against preliminary
image modification attacks and compression. Yet, they may fail when facing
attacks like the ones reported in Section 3. For this reason, several methods
have been developed for contrasting the effects of these attacks.
Currently, the most relevant ones are the following:
Demosaicing-based camera model identification: this method detects if
the fingerprint of the originating source camera embedded in a target image
has been falsified. The algorithm works by characterizing the different local
pixel relationships regardless of the content introduced by both authentic de-
mosaicing algorithms and by anti-forensic attacks. An anti-forensic attacker,
in fact, can falsify these traces by maliciously using existing forensic tech-
niques to estimate one camera’s demosaicing filter, then use these estimates
to re-demosaic an image captured by another camera [10].
PRNU-based Forged Regions Detection: this method detect and operate
small forged regions and automatically. The Sensor Pattern Noise (SPN) is
extracted from the target image and, then, it is correlated with the reference
SPN of a target camera. The two noises are divided into non-overlapping
blocks before evaluating their correlations, so as to return a correlation map.
Then, a set of operators is applied on the resulting map to highlight the
forged regions and remove the noise peaks [6].
The Triangle Test: this method has been proposed by Fridrich et al. to reveal
fingerprint-copy attacks[13]. It can be summarized as follows. Let Alice and
Eve be the victim and the attacker respectively. First, Alice publicly shares
a collection of images. Then, Eve grabs a copy of the images shared by Alice
and uses them to extract the fingerprint of the camera used to take them.
Given that the digital fingerprint of the camera estimated by Eva must be
of high quality and estimated by at least 300 images, its estimation error
contains the residuals of the entire residual noise of all the images used.
Using the correlation method, Alice can identify the images used by Eve for
deriving the target fingerprint used for the falsification and, so, she can prove
her innocence. Alice will be successful even when, being unable to arrange
any of the images, she will be able to analyze at least two counterfeit images
from Eve.
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4 Experimental analysis
Our thesis has been subject to a thorough experimental analysis.The goal has
been to assess if: 1) there are traces of the originating camera for an image being
spoofed 2) these traces are relevant enough to allow to identify the originating
camera.
To obtain more realistic results, we used different tools to carry on the attack
and to analyze its effect. This is a realistic scenario, because is highly probable
that the tools used by the attacker to extract the PRNU from a collection of
images, compute the corresponding RP and alter the original images are different
from the ones used for later analysis. In the same time, the will probably uses
some standard library for the same purpose. For both roles, we resorted to
tools implementing the algorithm by Fridrich et al. in [22], already available
in literature and widely used, as follows.
Attacker: here we used the matlab library developed at the Computer Science
Department of Universit degli Studi di Salerno and publicly available on
GitLab https://gitlab.com/dif_unisa/pnu_matlab. It has been used in
several publications, like [6,8,9,1,4,2,3]
Defender: here we used the matlab library developed by the DDE Labora-
tory at Binghamton University. It has been used in several publications, like
Fridrich et al. [18,15,17,13,19,12,16,14]
4.1 Dataset
The ideal dataset to be used for our experiments should be made of images
taken in such a way to not simplify neither the identification of the original
cameras neither the spoofing process. For this reason, we opted for not using the
standard CASIA TIDE (Tampered Image Detection Evaluation) dataset, as it
has proven to include images containing statistical artifacts able to influence the
identification process (see [7]).
Instead, we created two reference dataset:
– small dataset: it includes 1, 000 images coming from 4 different smartphone
cameras. The structure of this dataset is reported in table 1;
– large dataset: it includes 5, 140 images coming from 20 different cameras.
Each of these images has been taken taken using camera tripod, controlled
light and, as subject, a sheet conforming to ISO 15739:2017 (see Fig 4.1)
to maximize the PRNU in the images. This dataset has been assembled
in cooperation with the Italian Postal Police Department for fight against
pedopornography.The structure of this dataset is reported in table 2.
4.2 Description of the experiment
Let C and C′ be two different cameras and let I be an image taken using C.
Here the attacker is interested in spoofing I so to make it result as taken using
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Brand Model Resolution #images
1 Samsung Galaxy S9 Plus 4032 × 3024 px 250
2 Honor Honor 8 3968 × 3024 px 250
3 Apple iPhone Xs 4032 × 3024 px 250
4 Apple iPhone SE 4290 × 2800 px 250
Table 1. Structure of our small dataset
Fig. 1. Example of enrollment images taken with Nikon D90 and ISO 15739:2017 noise
enhancement sheet
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Identifier Brand Model Resolution Inject RP Comparison RP Spoofable Total
IC 190 Nikon D90 4288 × 2848 100 100 57 257
IC 191 Nikon D91 4288 × 2848 100 100 57 257
IC 192 Nikon D92 4288 × 2848 100 100 57 257
IC 193 Nikon D93 4288 × 2848 100 100 57 257
IC 194 Nikon D94 4288 × 2848 100 100 57 257
IC 195 Nikon D95 4288 × 2848 100 100 57 257
IC 196 Nikon D96 4288 × 2848 100 100 57 257
IC 197 Nikon D97 4288 × 2848 100 100 57 257
IC 198 Nikon D98 4288 × 2848 100 100 57 257
IC 199 Nikon D99 4288 × 2848 100 100 57 257
IC 200 Nikon D100 4288 × 2848 100 100 57 257
IC 201 Nikon D101 4288 × 2848 100 100 57 257
IC 202 Nikon D102 4288 × 2848 100 100 57 257
IC 203 Nikon D103 4288 × 2848 100 100 57 257
IC 204 Nikon D104 4288 × 2848 100 100 57 257
IC 205 Nikon D105 4288 × 2848 100 100 57 257
IC 206 Nikon D106 4288 × 2848 100 100 57 257
IC 207 Nikon D107 4288 × 2848 100 100 57 257
IC 208 Nikon D108 4288 × 2848 100 100 57 257
IC 209 Nikon D109 4288 × 2848 100 100 57 257
Table 2. Structure of our large dataset
C′ . We assume that the attacker does not own camera C′ but, instead, he has a
collection of images taken with this camera.
We can define three steps in the experiment:
1. Setup
2. Spoofing
3. Comparing
The first and last step contains action that are commons to the attacker and
the investigator, like the generation of the RPs, and must not rely on a particular
implementation of the PRNU extraction libraries.
In the first steps, we generate a couple of RPs, one used by the attacker for
the spoofing procedure, call it RP sD where D is the device of the RP , and one
used by the investigator for the comparison procedure, call it RP cD where D is the
device of the RP , for each of the camera. For the first experiment, we generate
8 RP processing 800 images, for the second experiment 40 RPs processing 4000
images.
In the second step, we filter each of the 50 target images of each camera with
a Daubechis 8 wavelet filter to obtain a noiseless version FI of the image F .
To each FI , we sum the RP
s
D for each of the device D in the dataset used
for the experiment and the result is normalized in the range [0, 255] obtaining
the image IDFI
IDFI = FI ⊕RP sD ∀ D ∈ Dataset (5)
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At the and of this step, we have 200 filtered and 800 spoofed images for the
first dataset and 1140 filtered and 22800 spoofed images for the second dataset.
In the last step, we built a correlation matrix by correlating each one spoofed
images with all the comparison RPs generated in step one.
4.3 Experiment 1: Image Spoofing with crop and resize
In this first experiment, we are assuming that the image I being spoofed by the
attacker has a different resolution than the one of the sensor equipped by C′ .
This can be assumed to be a sort of baseline as it is unlikely, in the average case,
that these resolutions are identical.
Due the different size of the sensors of the different devices, the RPs must
be cropped or resized in order to fit into the target images.
The results of this experiment are reported in Table 3. We consider the spoof-
ing to be successful if the value of the correlation between the spoofing device
and the spoofed images is the highest over the correlation between the images
and the comparison RPs. Indeed, the spoofing activity is mostly unsuccessful,
as in just the 5% of cases the spoofed image is erroneously linked to a camera
different than the originating one. It is very likely that this failure is mostly
due to the crop and resize operations applied to RPs before injecting it in the
images being spoofed. These operations are known to affect the results of corre-
lation between RPs and RNs, because of the misalignments introduced in their
corresponding PNUs.
Small Dataset
Large Dataset
Full Spoofed
# of devices 4 20
# of training images per device 50 57
# of spoofed images 800 23940 22800
Percentage of successful spoofing 229 / 28.63% 21048 / 87.92% 21048 / 92.32%
Percentage of failed spoofing 571 / 71.38% 2932 / 12.08% 1752 / 7.68%
Table 3. Result of the spoofing experiment on both datasets. For the large dataset,
Full includes all the images, while Spoofed includes only the images spoofed with
other cameras
4.4 Experiment 2: Image Spoofing without crop and resize
We report the results for this second experiment in Table 3.
The success rate for this experiment is over 99%, a value that is inline with
the success rate in standard SCI over the same dataset (data not shown but
available upon request). Thus, the spoofing activity seems to have been success-
ful. However, if we look closer at these results, this does not seem to be true
anymore. In Table 4 we report the mean of the correlations evaluated during
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this experiment, aggregated according to the originating camera and the camera
being spoofed. On a side, as expected, the highest correlation is reached when
comparing the PRNU noise of a spoofed image with the reference pattern of
its corresponding spoofing camera. On the other side, we notice that the sec-
ond highest correlation value observed in almost all cases is the one between
the PRNU noise of a spoofed image and the reference pattern of its originating
camera. Two are the main consequences of these results. The first is that the
filtering operation applied to an image is not able to remove all traces of the
originating camera. The second is that, despite the spoofing, it is still possible
to identify the camera used to take a picture with a high confidence level.
IC 190 IC 191 IC 192 IC 193 IC 194 IC 195 IC 196 IC 197 IC 198 IC 199 IC 200 IC 201 IC 202 IC 203 IC 204 IC 205 IC 206 IC 207 IC 208 IC 209
FILTR 0,002125 0,003977 0,004208 0,003904 0,003397 0,001932 0,00407 0,004304 0,003039 0,003809 0,003861 0,002255 0,003175 0,003266 0,004316 0,004224 0,002975 0,00415 0,004161 0,003081
IC 190 0,234142 0,004322 0,005836 0,004118 -0,00257 -0,00078 0,006135 0,00409 -2E-05 0,002863 -0,00089 0,003506 0,002321 0,003868 0,005823 0,001352 0,004723 0,004864 0,007153 0,00329
IC 191 0,002597 0,214915 0,003638 0,00453 0,004276 0,005304 0,005545 0,004746 0,003881 0,004269 0,005426 0,005243 0,005524 0,003856 0,006468 0,006092 0,004011 0,004506 0,005637 0,005062
IC 192 0,003468 0,003271 0,217339 0,009874 0,002983 0,002404 0,003742 0,003153 0,001099 -0,00027 0,004584 -0,00137 -0,00299 0,006206 0,005882 0,006678 0,006631 0,009673 0,005232 0,007723
IC 193 0,002643 0,004454 0,010461 0,223698 -0,00216 0,003553 0,00703 0,000626 0,000274 0,003018 0,002927 -0,00336 0,000651 0,005068 0,004663 0,006571 0,008525 0,0075 0,006764 0,00616
IC 194 -0,00066 0,004808 0,004688 0,001709 0,104204 0,00287 0,004584 0,007509 0,007999 0,006539 0,009471 0,006507 0,006307 0,00322 0,005531 0,007233 -0,00035 0,005251 0,005373 0,007867
IC 195 0,000239 0,006652 0,004766 0,004744 0,004226 0,154363 0,005453 0,003385 0,003825 0,003296 0,003719 0,003487 0,005256 0,003408 0,005892 0,005695 0,004683 0,003834 0,005139 0,005205
IC 196 0,003933 0,005792 0,004338 0,006201 0,004188 0,003803 0,20776 0,005277 0,003715 0,005875 0,0045 0,004187 0,008896 0,002022 -0,00104 0,0055 0,004645 0,002925 0,016204 0,002856
IC 197 0,002425 0,004061 0,002207 -0,00106 0,010031 0,000428 0,004606 0,276179 0,007894 0,005678 0,012029 0,008495 0,004519 0,002882 0,006905 0,007182 -0,00397 0,005151 0,005201 0,000748
IC 198 -0,00128 0,004728 0,002311 0,000523 0,01414 0,003042 0,004395 0,010544 0,2626 0,005492 0,008129 0,008084 0,00507 0,002811 0,006096 0,007409 -0,00116 0,003861 0,005054 0,010088
IC 199 0,001225 0,004417 0,000172 0,002819 0,008138 0,001916 0,006167 0,006431 0,004924 0,250346 0,005102 0,006843 0,009925 0,002402 0,005518 0,004689 0,003717 0,001363 0,005917 0,002383
IC 200 -0,00265 0,005623 0,00431 0,00307 0,01388 0,000865 0,003939 0,011236 0,006938 0,00467 0,235594 0,002614 0,003942 0,005226 0,005004 0,008775 0,000789 0,005909 0,005237 0,004192
IC 201 0,002832 0,006106 0,001332 -0,00017 0,00895 0,003255 0,005424 0,008254 0,006477 0,006828 0,00463 0,122455 0,008385 0,004796 0,0062 0,002674 0,001291 -0,00045 0,004829 0,003528
IC 202 0,001306 0,005659 -0,00209 0,001551 0,009028 0,004438 0,010643 0,005823 0,004532 0,010196 0,004418 0,009975 0,218588 -0,00333 0,003364 0,005828 0,002741 0,000649 0,008424 0,005018
IC 203 0,002686 0,004669 0,00746 0,004805 0,002783 0,002422 0,001482 0,004599 0,002717 0,003021 0,005859 0,004769 -0,00343 0,193877 0,006382 0,004329 0,004955 0,007442 0,002437 0,003977
IC 204 0,003567 0,005666 0,005715 0,004134 0,004819 0,003638 -0,00091 0,006635 0,004505 0,004894 0,005071 0,005213 0,002703 0,005428 0,16552 0,004516 0,002252 0,010877 0,002854 0,00427
IC 205 -0,00062 0,006084 0,006626 0,006379 0,007962 0,004435 0,00548 0,006682 0,005915 0,003823 0,008354 -8,2E-05 0,005218 0,003466 0,004511 0,214824 0,000607 0,005724 0,004595 0,009337
IC 206 0,004006 0,004761 0,007475 0,009573 -0,00496 0,004014 0,005697 -0,0015 -0,00138 0,003854 0,001226 -0,00022 0,002455 0,005465 0,003081 0,00137 0,250338 0,005127 0,006134 0,001586
IC 207 0,002846 0,004285 0,009573 0,007383 0,004882 0,001839 0,001743 0,005762 0,002644 0,001159 0,005804 -0,00474 -0,00053 0,006249 0,013118 0,006332 0,003917 0,238089 0,00211 0,005685
IC 208 0,004825 0,005138 0,005029 0,006384 0,005202 0,003077 0,017009 0,005224 0,003928 0,00519 0,004618 0,003039 0,007132 0,002066 0,002264 0,004615 0,004625 0,00232 0,194705 0,005239
IC 209 0,002291 0,00603 0,009133 0,006759 0,012402 0,004723 0,003346 0,002658 0,009435 0,002872 0,00545 0,003682 0,004975 0,004341 0,005523 0,010146 0,001616 0,006822 0,006589 0,228341
Table 4. Correlation heatmap for the experiment run on the large dataset. On each
column, it is reported each of the considered reference camera devices. On each row, it
is reported each of the camera device used for spoofing. The generic (i, j) entry of the
heatmap reports the correlation value obtained when comparing the RPs of camera
i with the PRNU noise extracted from an image where it was previously injected
the RPs of j. The horizontal row labeled as FILTR represents the correlation values
obtained by comparing the collection of images obtained by each of the considered
camera devices with their filtered counterparts.
IC 190 IC 191 IC 192 IC 193 IC 194 IC 195 IC 196 IC 197 IC 198 IC 199 IC 200 IC 201 IC 202 IC 203 IC 204 IC 205 IC 206 IC 207 IC 208 IC 209
IC 190 0.253579 -0.0004 0.088895 0.002456 -0.00672 -0.00447 0.001298 -0.00182 -0.00632 -0.00547 -0.00689 -0.00356 -0.00507 0.002491 0.002895 -0.00182 -0.00012 0.003421 0.002491 0.001579
IC 191 -0.00161 0.232298 0.089123 0.002947 0.000895 0.002368 -0.00021 -0.00153 -0.00218 -0.00423 1,75E-05 -0.00146 -0.00209 0.002368 0.003316 0.003351 -0.001 0.00314 0.000439 0.003947
IC 192 -3,5E-05 -0.00172 0.314246 0.009368 -0.00161 -0.00082 -0.00202 -0.00318 -0.00493 -0.00905 -0.00091 -0.00974 -0.01142 0.005088 0.002351 0.003526 0.002719 0.008842 -8,8E-05 0.006439
IC 193 -0.00116 -0.00046 0.095491 0.244088 -0.00623 0.000667 0.001614 -0.0057 -0.00619 -0.00565 -0.00263 -0.0107 -0.00714 0.003368 0.001491 0.003807 0.004684 0.006825 0.00186 0.004947
IC 194 -0.00525 -0.00047 0.09786 0.000316 0.112789 -0.0004 -0.0016 0.001316 0.001965 -0.00249 0.004193 -0.00147 -0.00216 0.001474 0.001982 0.004702 -0.00575 0.004228 -0.00053 0.007035
IC 195 -0.00409 0.002 0.094088 0.003386 0.000439 0.166228 -0.00072 -0.00304 -0.00237 -0.00581 -0.0016 -0.00396 -0.00265 0.001895 0.002474 0.003 -0.00025 0.00214 -0.00033 0.003579
IC 196 0.000421 0.000965 0.091474 0.004895 0.001053 0.000175 0.22214 -0.00067 -0.0023 -0.00254 -0.00121 -0.00286 0.001526 0.00014 -0.00516 0.002684 -0.00035 0.001719 0.012123 0.001263
IC 197 -0.001 -0.00033 0.079123 -0.00328 0.007596 -0.00298 -0.00039 0.297667 0.002982 -0.00163 0.008088 0.003088 -0.0026 0.001 0.004228 0.004667 -0.00891 0.00393 0.000596 -0.00109
IC 198 -0.00518 0.000123 0.081544 -0.00132 0.011947 -0.00018 -0.00114 0.005737 0.281228 -0.002 0.003386 0.001965 -0.00188 0.001246 0.003351 0.005175 -0.00642 0.002544 0.000526 0.009263
IC 199 -0.00256 -0.00042 0.081614 0.001035 0.005263 -0.00137 0.000667 0.001018 -0.00033 0.267298 1,75E-05 0.000175 0.00293 0.000596 0.002193 0.001719 -0.00084 -0.00032 0.000737 0.00086
IC 200 -0.007 0.000982 0.087228 0.001246 0.011439 -0.00211 -0.002 0.006228 0.001702 -0.00335 0.254684 -0.00337 -0.00335 0.004421 0.001509 0.006509 -0.00377 0.004754 -9,1E-20 0.00307
IC 201 -0.0014 0.001158 0.092684 -0.00179 0.005246 -0.00021 -0.00049 0.002421 0.000439 -0.00196 -0.00077 0.129123 0.000491 0.003368 0.002719 -0.00082 -0.00446 -0.00247 -0.00084 0.001456
IC 202 -0.00233 0.001053 0.081719 8,77E-05 0.005719 0.001351 0.005737 -3E-20 -0.00121 0.002491 -0.00102 0.004298 0.233596 -0.00553 -0.00014 0.003018 -0.00188 -0.00096 0.003789 0.003772
IC 203 -0.00084 -0.00051 0.093351 0.003456 -0.00116 -0.0007 -0.0047 -0.00149 -0.0033 -0.00561 0.000684 -0.00212 -0.01209 0.210982 0.003246 0.001246 0.00014 0.007 -0.00346 0.002579
IC 204 -0.0004 0.000614 0.095263 0.002614 0.001386 0.00014 -0.00793 0.000579 -0.00142 -0.00407 -0.00079 -0.00219 -0.00593 0.004123 0.17914 0.001614 -0.00286 0.010456 -0.00267 0.00293
IC 205 -0.00468 0.001526 0.091386 0.005193 0.005 0.001281 -3,5E-05 0.001018 0.000246 -0.00479 0.003298 -0.00782 -0.00256 0.001965 0.001193 0.231474 -0.00405 0.004596 -0.00049 0.008333
IC 206 -0.00011 5,26E-05 0.088614 0.008807 -0.00846 0.000614 0.000211 -0.00821 -0.00786 -0.00411 -0.00402 -0.00782 -0.00472 0.003807 1,22E-19 -0.00163 0.26907 0.003912 0.001368 0.000193
IC 207 -0.00095 -0.00086 0.092947 0.006456 0.002088 -0.00181 -0.00418 -8,8E-05 -0.00333 -0.00744 0.000316 -0.01289 -0.00867 0.005 0.010632 0.003772 -0.00088 0.258561 -0.00333 0.004772
IC 208 0.001175 1,75E-05 0.091789 0.005228 0.001614 -0.00051 0.012649 -0.00077 -0.00193 -0.00337 -0.00091 -0.00433 -0.00028 0.000281 -0.00132 0.001982 -0.00028 0.00093 0.209298 0.004
IC 209 -0.00172 0.001333 0.09286 0.005702 0.01014 0.001281 -0.00239 -0.00354 0.004263 -0.00535 0.000404 -0.00444 -0.00265 0.002825 0.002298 0.007965 -0.00337 0.006035 0.001807 0.248175
Table 5. Aggregated correlation matrix for images from original camera IC 192. On
the columns the comparison devices on the rows the spoof devices. In green are marked
the highest value for comparison in each row, in yellow the second largest value and in
red the lowest
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The residue PNU in these image became more evident analyzing the cor-
relation with the filtered only images (see Table 6). In this case, the highest
correlation value mean is always associated with the original camera and is al-
most ten times higher than the rest of the values. The second highest value is
randomly distributed over the row.
IC 190 IC 191 IC 192 IC 193 IC 194 IC 195 IC 196 IC 197 IC 198 IC 199 IC 200 IC 201 IC 202 IC 203 IC 204 IC 205 IC 206 IC 207 IC 208 IC 209
IC 190 0.077842 -0.00249 -0.00054 -0.00056 -0.00816 -0.00384 0.001737 -0.00198 -0.00347 -0.0027 -0.00577 -0.00046 -0.00168 -0.002 -0.00121 -0.00374 0.001614 -0.0007 0.00114 -0.00247
IC 191 -0.00344 0.08886 -0.00182 -0.00153 -0.0033 0.00286 -0.00023 -0.00158 -0.00035 -0.00114 0.000772 0.000491 0.000105 -0.00075 7,02E-05 0.002526 -0.00082 -0.002 -0.00093 -0.00165
IC 192 -0.00189 -0.00142 0.099649 0.002632 -0.00035 -0.00167 -0.00216 -0.00218 -0.0036 -0.00544 -0.00228 -0.00575 -0.00535 0.001877 0.000737 0.001281 -0.00237 0.003088 -0.00144 0.001561
IC 193 -0.00102 -0.00135 0.004316 0.092246 -0.00514 -0.00118 0.001368 -0.00314 -0.00388 -0.00274 -0.00189 -0.00696 -0.00418 -0.00061 -0.00265 0.002737 0.001807 0.002947 -0.00012 0.00193
IC 194 -0.00139 -0.0023 -0.00081 -0.00305 0.070982 -0.00086 -0.00182 -0.00081 -0.00107 -0.00014 -0.00107 -0.00168 -0.00175 -0.00133 -0.00251 -0.00167 -0.00168 0.000193 -0.00081 -0.00193
IC 195 -0.00282 0.002579 -0.00044 -0.00037 -0.00207 0.068684 -0.00011 -0.00268 -0.00082 -0.00142 -0.0013 -0.00328 -0.00054 -0.0024 -0.00174 0.00186 -0.00042 -0.00219 -0.00074 -0.00026
IC 196 -7E-05 -8,8E-05 -0.00132 0.000175 -0.00095 -0.00084 0.082825 0.000351 -0.00039 -7E-05 -0.00054 -0.00116 0.000895 -0.00202 -0.00267 -0.00032 -0.00047 1,75E-05 0.000281 -0.00082
IC 197 -0.00323 -0.00163 -0.00475 -0.00518 0.005404 -0.00365 0.001947 0.105386 0.001456 0.004298 0.003632 0.004807 0.000772 -0.00346 0.001105 -0.00312 -0.00596 -0.00088 -0.00098 -0.00502
IC 198 -0.00279 -0.00077 -0.00351 -0.00389 0.005561 -0.00135 0.000421 0.000965 0.07707 0.001982 0.000789 0.001298 0.000228 -0.00198 -0.00125 -0.00054 -0.00335 -0.00284 -0.00112 0.000491
IC 199 -0.00223 -0.00058 -0.00344 -0.00074 0.002912 -0.00181 -0.00019 0.00086 0.000351 0.091737 -0.00233 -0.00153 -0.00102 -0.00105 -0.00107 -0.00156 -0.00088 -0.00228 -0.00095 -0.00182
IC 200 -0.00375 0.001456 -0.00247 -0.00137 0.007333 -0.00249 -0.00214 0.002632 0.002298 -0.00018 0.093596 -0.00158 -0.0014 0.000263 -0.00056 0.000509 -0.00182 -0.00035 -0.00098 -0.00214
IC 201 -0.00077 5,26E-05 -0.00095 -0.00121 -0.00261 -0.00347 -0.00079 -0.00104 -8,8E-05 -0.00163 -0.0024 0.084228 0.000491 0.002474 -0.00144 -0.00172 -0.00163 -0.00672 -0.00186 -0.00119
IC 202 -0.00146 0.000175 -0.00295 -0.00261 0.002877 -0.00137 0.003754 0.000386 -0.00067 0.001298 0.000333 0.002807 0.085351 -0.00267 -0.00196 -0.00028 -0.00279 -0.00458 0.002825 -0.00177
IC 203 -0.00161 -0.00065 0.001 -0.00096 -0.00058 -0.00365 -0.00414 -0.00195 -0.00151 -0.00144 7,02E-05 0.000491 -0.00375 0.086158 -0.0003 -0.00119 -0.00139 0.000649 -0.00407 -0.00112
IC 204 -0.00139 -0.00088 0.000702 -0.0013 -0.00267 -0.00198 -0.00163 0.000456 -0.0006 0.000175 -0.00163 -0.00012 0.000263 -0.0003 0.104912 -0.00063 -0.0013 0.001667 -0.00082 5,26E-05
IC 205 -0.00239 0.001544 0.001158 0.001579 0.000439 0.000737 -0.00037 -0.00172 0.000509 -0.00086 -0.00058 -0.00572 -0.00042 -0.00072 -0.00114 0.091105 -0.00025 -0.0003 -0.00091 0.002263
IC 206 -0.00109 -0.00147 -1,8E-05 0.001035 -0.00718 -0.00096 8,77E-05 -0.00381 -0.00365 -0.00291 -0.00046 -0.00474 -0.00349 -0.00111 -0.00354 -0.00056 0.082053 0.000228 -0.00133 -0.00067
IC 207 -0.00132 -0.00105 0.000509 0.000965 0.001158 -0.00186 0.000316 -0.00109 -0.00139 -0.00279 -0.00084 -0.00896 -0.00311 -0.00098 0.003947 -0.00104 0.000474 0.097386 -0.00193 0.000912
IC 208 -0.00032 -0.00023 -0.00102 0.000702 -0.00019 -0.00149 0.002439 -0.00035 -0.00049 -0.00011 0.000702 -0.00242 0.001737 -0.00282 -0.00154 -0.00088 -0.00068 -0.00158 0.098351 -0.00116
IC 209 -0.00239 -0.00021 0.00086 0.001509 0.004474 -0.00116 8,77E-05 -0.00265 0.001053 0.000246 -0.00156 -0.00465 0.000368 -0.00125 -0.00088 0.001702 -0.00063 0.001246 -0.00037 0.076439
Table 6. Aggregated correlation matrix for filtered only images. On the columns the
comparison devices on the rows the original devices. In green are marked the highest
value for comparison in each row, in yellow the second largest value and in red the
lowest
5 Conclusions and Future Works
In this paper, we have analyzed some of the existing attack procedures in SCI
and developed a different approach for the search for image counterfeits through
fingerprints that achieve a good trade-off between the requirements described in
Section 4. Indeed, the proposed method required physical access to the source
camera device and the target camera is must be the same model as the original
one. Therefore, though the experimental results obtained still have some limita-
tions due to certain circumstances, they continued to confirm the robustness of
the PRNU.
Future works will be dedicated to investigate other smarter attacks from
hacker’s side on the PRNU through the use of smartphone technologies. In fact,
the latest generation smartphones are, extremely, powerful and versatile. Devel-
oped according to new technologies, most of them are equipped with multiple
cameras and allow you to take excellent images. All this thanks to a new photo
generation process that has more details and noise reduction, through its recon-
struction that takes the best pixels from the other shots. In this new scenario,
it will be interesting to verify the existence and robustness of the PRNU.
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